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ABSTRACT 
 
Aim of the paper: The purpose is to gather the practices and to model the impacts of cli-
mate change on fiscal spending and revenues, responsibilities and opportunities, balance and 
debt related to climate change (CC).  
 
Methodology of the paper: The methodology will distinguish fiscal cost of mitigation and 
adaptation, besides direct and indirect costs. It will also introduce cost benefit analyses to 
evaluate the propensity of policy makers for action or passivity. Several scenarios will be 
drafted to see the different outcomes. The scenarios shall contain the possible losses in the 
natural and artificial environment and resources. Impacts on public budget are based on 
damage of income opportunities and capital/wealth/natural assets. There will be a list of ac-
tions when the fiscal correction of market failures will be necessary. 
 
Findings: There will be a summary and synthesis of estimation models on CC impacts on 
public finances, and morals of existing/existed budgeting practices on mitigation. The model 
will be based on damages (and maybe benefits) from CC, adjusted with probabilities of sce-
narios and policy making propensity for action. Findings will cover the way of funding of fis-
cal costs. 
 
Practical use, value added: From the synthesis of model, the fiscal cost of mitigation and 
adaptation can be estimated for any developed, emerging and developing countries. The pa-
per will try to reply, also, for the challenge how to harmonize fiscal and developmental sus-
tainability. 
 
Keywords: public finance, fiscal sustainability, climate change 
JEL code: D62, E62, H23, H40, H80, H84, H87,  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In most industrialized countries, there are many factors that could ruin fis-
cal sustainability before any mentioning of the cost of climate change. The 
aging population, the welfare state reform, the recovery from global crisis, the 
tax competition, the rigidities of labour markets already have resulted robust 
debt levels.
2
 The determining debt level warns for an important constraint in 
the beginning: The fiscal cost of mitigation and adaptation can not be financed 
                                               
1. Assistant professor of Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD of Economics, 
gbor.kutasi@uni-corvinus.hu. The research as base of the paper was supported by TÁMOP-
4.2.1.B-09/1/KMR-2010-0005. 
2. The approximately debt-to-GDP ratios are: USA 100%, Japan 225%, France 80%, Germany 
75%, Britain 70% etc. Source: Eurostat. 
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simply from public debt. Even a new type of taxes is not risk free in a very 
bounded fiscal room for maneuver. 
 
It is preferable to examine the impacts of climate in the fiscal environment 
drafted above. Nevertheless, the climate change is an expected occurrence in 
the future of the 21st century, which depends on many factors. This uncertain-
ty or probability creates a more complex challenge for fiscal strategy. The re-
gional variability of extent of warming or frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather events (cyclones, hurricanes, storms) or importance of coastal rise in 
the sea level still increases the complexity of fiscal analysis.  
 
The mitigation and adaptation to climate change means any private or pub-
lic action to prevent the change of temperature or adjust to a changed climate. 
Aaheim & Aasen (2008) distinguish autonomous and planned ways. The au-
tonomous adaptation is the case, when private individuals do something for 
adjustment in uncoordinated way. This could have been a cheap way for pub-
lic finances, but also results suboptimal solution because of bias for individual 
free riding, emergence of common pool resource problem, or uncertainty. That 
is why planned adjustment, namely fiscal adaptation is necessary, too, to mo-
tivate the private sector for (pro-)action. Nevertheless, the autonomous ad-
justment also has impact on tax revenues and public transfers. E.g., energy 
saving means less pollution-related tax payment, or direct investments in re-
newable energy equipment can create right to get public subsidy. 
 
To adopt the debt sustainability aspect into the frame of climate change 
aspects, the long-term solvency, the budget constraint, the primary gap indica-
tor has been applied. Besides indebtedness, refocusing fiscal spending and re-
setting the extent of public budget invoke the Keynesian fiscal crowding out 
impact. 
 
This study overviews the public finances aspects of climate change. The 
sustainability is in focus, but this time the fiscal one and not the development 
aspect. The purpose is to gather the practices and to model the impacts of cli-
mate change on fiscal spending and revenues, responsibilities and opportuni-
ties, balance and debt related to climate change. 
 
3.2. HOW TO SURVEY THE FISCAL IMPACTS OF A NATURAL 
PROCESS? 
 
As a methodological simplification, the climate change can be translated 
as significant shift in average temperature, thus there is a variable or factor for 
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calculations.
3
 The modeling of fiscal impacts shall be examined in the frame 
of temperature change causing damages or benefits, and cost of mitigation or 
adaptation. If climate change got realized globally, it does not mean a general-
ly same extent of change of temperature in every region and territory of the 
Earth. (It is possible more or less warming in temperature or even cooling is a 
likely outcome in certain regions.) As warming may be so different, the physi-
cal impact can be various. In some region, the rise of sea might will take costal 
territories, in some region the hart illnesses might will rise by warmer climate, 
in other territories the agricultural lands will dry out, somewhere else the dis-
appearance of ice and snow create land cultivation opportunities or ruin the 
winter tourism etc. But what is the likelihood in a continent, a country, a coun-
ty or a city/village level? If there are more scenarios, what are the effective 
mitigation and adaptation actions? What is the critical mass or scale of action? 
Will the actors wait for each other to act? Who should act first? Should the 
state intervene, motivate, initiate? And so on. If such uncertain probabilities 
are accumulated (namely multiplied), finally the likelihood of effective actions 
can be low (see fig. 1). 
 
Figure 3.1. Increasing uncertainty in climate change (CC) 
 
Source: Simplified adaptation from Stern (2007) and O’Hara (2009) 
 
Heller (2003:19) refers to the IPCC (2001) projections on expectable 
change of temperature in 100 years term horizon, which forecasts 1.9–5.8 Cel-
sius (3–10 Fahrenheit) gradual warming by the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere. The uncertainty of temperature change can be illus-
trated in a fan chart of probable further future expectations.  
 
Besides high uncertainty, the economic actors should agree in the distribu-
tion of financing between public and private players. The economic motiva-
tion for participation can be established, if the participants can get at least so 
much benefit from mitigation and adaptation actions as much cost they invest. 
Nevertheless, there are private actors (or maybe even state actors in the inter-
national relations), who are not able to finance themselves the adaptation. 
                                               
3. The estimation of global and regional probability, extent and direction of temperature 
change is a natural science question, thus in public finances study, it will be treated as an ex-
ternal factor. 
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Thus, the public decision makers must determine the extent of equity toward 
poor economic actors. (CEPS & ZEW 2010) This aspect raises the equity vs. 
efficiency trade-off dilemma, whether the fiscal resources should be used for 
subsidizing rich or poor actors (by direct spending or tax refunding). To re-
solve the dilemma, the economic theory knows the utilitarian approach and the 
Rawls approach. In case of climate change mitigation, the specific carbon 
emission per household of different social groups can guide the balancing be-
tween equity and efficiency. However, equity is not just a dilemma in social 
class dimension, but in geographical view, too. Which are the populated and 
industrial areas deserving protection against higher sea level or other natural 
damages? See the bad practice case of New Orleans in 2005. How well devel-
oped hurricane warning system has it done worth to be financed? How big ef-
forts and how quickly has it done worth to save people right after the catastro-
phe? Or see the Dutch agricultural lands under the sea level. How far should 
they be protected? Do these lands produce enough income to protect them 
from the sea?  
 
The policy making – in relation to market motivation – must decide anoth-
er dilemma between short-term profit and long-term supply what can be called 
supply security dilemma. (CEPS & ZEW 2010) In which territories should the 
state sustain the supply of energy, food, transportation, safe water and sewage 
system, pipelines? The prices and the (in)elasticity of the (network) service 
markets, the intensity of destructive competition
4
, will decide the short-term 
profit. When the profit is negative, the state may force the service companies 
to supply – or maybe not. 
 
In case of climate change, the likelihood of irreversibility is important de-
terminant. Although an early mitigation action can look like unworthy because 
of high uncertainty and low probability of occurrence of damages far before 
the forecasted warming or disasters, an overdue mitigation can not reverse the 
natural, environmental changes. In this case, only adaptation remains as op-
tion. (CEPS & ZEW 2010) The economics of decision theory suppose to use 
the net present value (NPV) to choose the more worthy option. In climate 
change relation, the comparable options are the NPV of an earlier mitigation 
or the NPV of a later adaptation. 
 
To estimate the fiscal costs, the market capacity, propensity and perfection 
is preferable to be examined. It should be estimated, how far can the govern-
ment levy the burden of adaptation on the private sector (solvency, marginal 
proactive propensity etc.), and can the market manage the risk to have demand 
                                               
4. Destructive competition: service markets where (1) the fix cost (exit cost) is high, (2) the 
competition is intensive and presses the price to low level and (3) the demand is very volatile 
(some times much, some times few), the three characteristics together cause frequent bank-
ruptcy what endangers the supply security. 
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and supply to meet and avoid the market failures. In climate disasters, first of 
all, the insurance sector should be helped to be able to manage the risk as far 
as possible.    
 
To treat the impacts of climate change, it is possible to mitigate, what – 
according to Heller (2003:25) – means much effort devoted to reducing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases.  
 
Here public sector involvement may involve replacing existing taxes with 
new ones that promote reduced emission. Or there may be more active use of 
regulation, whether of the command-and-control or the market-based type 
(…), in which case the fiscal consequences are likely to be more limited. Hel-
ler (2003:25). 
 
If mitigation is too late, or it is too expensive for preventing a not too like-
ly event, the adaptation to new/changed circumstances can be another re-
sponse. According to Heller (2003:23), the extent and cost of adaptation is re-
gional or country specific, as it depends on the intensity of climate change, the 
embodiment of environmental or geographic changes, and the side effects on 
economy and physical assets. Heller thinks the following. 
 
Although much of the burden of relocating resources and financing new 
investment will undoubtedly fall on the private sector, it is unlikely that the 
public sector will remain unscathed, especially in countries, such as many de-
veloping countries, where the net economic impact of climate change is ex-
pected to negative. Areas of potential public sector involvement include out-
lays on infrastructure (…), other public goods in the areas of disease preven-
tion and agricultural extension and research (…), and subsidies (to facilitate 
the resettlement of population) (Heller 2003:23). 
 
As the significant warming is forecasted for century long, the public fiscal 
intervention is far more necessary in case of produced capital stocks, build-
ings, physical infrastructure with lifetime over 50. Especially, if unexpected or 
unlikely, radically destructive disasters or abrupt changes cause high scale of 
short-term cost.    
 
The methodology on surveying fiscal impacts by climate change distin-
guishes fiscal cost of mitigation and adaptation, besides direct and indirect 
costs. It also introduces cost benefit analyses to evaluate the propensity of pol-
icy makers for action or passivity. Scenarios shall be drafted to see the differ-
ent outcomes. The scenarios shall contain the possible losses in the natural and 
artificial environment and resources. Impacts on public budget are based on 
damage of income opportunities and capital/wealth/natural assets. In the fol-
lowings, there is a composed list of actions when the fiscal correction of mar-
ket failures is be necessary. 
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When fiscal cost of climate change is under survey, two main type of cost, 
the direct and the indirect costs can be distinguished. The direct costs are easi-
ly identifiable, however it is assumed to be smaller part of total costs. The dif-
ficulties with the identification of indirect costs alert for efficiency challenges, 
because the transparency of total cost of adaptation gets deteriorated. If costs 
are not transparent, economic participants will not be willing to finance it or 
support it, thus, the absent funding ruins the efficiency of any actions. The 
mechanism of direct and indirect costs can be described by the model on driv-
ers of fiscal impacts.   
 
3.3. MODELING THE FISCAL IMPACTS 
 
In the model on drivers, the CEPS & ZEW (2010) gathered the fiscal im-
plication of climate change and identified six drivers that determine the size 
and importance of the fiscal implications. These are: (1) the degree of expo-
sure to gradual and extreme climate events; (2) the level of protection already 
in place in areas at risk, i.e. preparedness; (3) the state’s liability for damages; 
(4) the potential and impacts of autonomous adaptation and remedial actions; 
(5) the cross-border effects of climate change; and (6) the fiscal capacity of the 
member states and the role of the EU. 
 
The mechanism of drivers is illustrated in Figure 3.2, below. Direct fiscal 
costs are the construction and maintenance of protective infrastructures, the 
additional maintenance of public infrastructures affected by climate change, 
the changes in social expenditures mainly from potential repercussions on em-
ployment or alterations in health expenditures. A certain type of direct “cost” 
can be the revenue changes of the budget because of shifts in the economic 
and trade structure or in the consumption. The indirect fiscal costs appears as 
impacts on fiscal capacity to deal with very long-term challenges, like climate 
change, by definition of CEPS & ZEW (2010:52). 
 
The degree of exposure means the above mentioned region-specific char-
acteristics related to local geography, climate and location in climatic belt 
(e.g., average temperature, rainfall, coastal facilities, etc.). The level of protec-
tion means the existing infrastructure for protecting or monitoring and early 
warning systems against natural disasters endangering lives and economic 
values, extreme weather conditions endangering human health. High level of 
existing protection saves a lot of investments for the budgets in the future. 
However, it has been meaning a high level of permanent operating cost to 
keep the condition of systems and edifices. Early mitigating investments and 
intensive technological developments can reduce such type of cost factors. 
State liabilities for damages are any type of promise of state or expectable aid 
and help from the state which are paid or financed for victims of natural catas-
trophes, or financing the natural disaster relief. To reduce the scale of such 
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liabilities, sophisticated and well developed private insurance sector is neces-
sary, and thus the public support for its development is recommended.  
 
Figure 3.2. Drivers of impacts, various national concerns 
 
Source: CEPS & ZEW (2010:52, Fig. 3.2) 
 
Autonomous adaptation as driver of fiscal impacts represents the coopera-
tive, initiative and supportive propensity of the private sector individuals. The 
actual occurrence of autonomous adaptation is the result of private utility-
maximization objectives and their assessment of risks. The cross-border ef-
fects as impact drivers include two types of cost factors. One is the residual 
costs from actions in another country, the other type is the aid transfers for de-
veloping countries to adapt to climate change, or technology transfer to miti-
gate. Fiscal capacity as determinant of scale of spending for mitigation and 
adaptation shall be understood in dynamic approach. Not only the given bal-
ance of revenues and expenditure matters, but the potential changes of them 
do, too. This is called fiscal flexibility what means the taxation and spending 
room for maneuver of the fiscal government, the realizable potential scale of 
change of tax burden and expenditure by discretionary decisions. Standard & 
Poor’s rating agency has even developed an indicator, the Fiscal Flexibility 
Index with sub-indices such as Expenditure Flexibility Index and Revenue 
Flexibility Index (see Standard & Poor’s 2007a and Standard & Poor’s 
2007b). The fiscal flexibility can be extended through – first of all – the mini-
mized indebtedness, the economic growth friendly economic policy and the 
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lower scale of public finances, namely, lower total tax burden and public 
spending intensity with same balance (Benczes & Kutasi 2010:95). 
 
Generally, the cost impact of the drivers can be reduced by technological 
(R&D) investments, supranational provision and assistance, internationally 
integrated financial and technological resources, expansion of insurance mar-
ket, regulation of land and water use, information provision for awareness, di-
rect fiscal incentives to help individual actors for autonomous mitigation, re-
view of state liabilities (CEPS & ZEW 2010:59-62).  
 
As mentioned above, fiscal impacts can be derived from the economic im-
pacts which are preferable to be anticipated by the economic actors. Such gen-
eral impacts are the average temperature in the seasons, along with an ex-
pected rise in temperature extremes; precipitation patterns; snow cover; water 
systems – particularly river flows (flood and drought risks) and groundwater 
levels; and coastal regions – with sea level rise and flood risks.  
 
3.4. FISCAL POLICY DILEMMAS RELATED TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
 
Through the recognition of indebtedness of highly developed (and climate 
sensitive) countries, the climate dilemmas of public finances can be worded. 
The first dilemma is the following. As there is no satisfying room for issuing 
more debt to cover the fiscal climate adaptation, the two options for fiscal pol-
icy are the redistribution among the items of taxes and spending or levy as 
much cost as possible on the private sector through perfect markets, like a so-
phisticated insurance sector. However, the two horns of the dilemma demand 
challenging balancing. If the private sector with limited time horizon got no 
fiscal (public) impulse at all, the private perception on net present value of ad-
aptation will be considered to be negative, as individuals of the private sector 
can not optimize for the endless future, or more then a few generation. (See 
the paradox of Ricardian equivalence.
5
) In the contrary case, getting excessive 
fiscal subsidies, the community of individuals of the private sector will expect 
any adaptation from the state, thus remain passive. 
                                               
5. In the economics models, it is a reasonable assumption, that the states as actors are immor-
tal, so they should be considered as infinite ones. That is why, the Ricardian equivalence can 
presume, that it is indifferent for the state to finance a new item of spending either from rais-
ing tax or from public debt. If it was true, this aspect gives opportunity for infinite Ponzi game 
for states, and just always accumulates higher and higher debt by promising higher and higher 
future tax revenues. However, O’Conell & Zeldes (1988) and also Buiter (2004) emphasized, 
that it is not possible because of the finite or limited horizon of individual households as buyer 
of public bonds. As the buyers are thinking in finite future and they are in limited number, the 
assumption of public bonds with infinite maturity is unrealistic. Besides, the imperfection of 
capital markets can not treat perfectly the uncertainty of the future. That is why it is expecta-
ble from the state to pay all the debts in the unseen future, namely what is expressed in the 
form of  PV (debt + future expenditures) = PV(future revenues). 
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The second dilemma rooted also in the limited room for issuing debt. The 
fiscal decision makers are forced by indebtedness to select among private ac-
tors, and create preference lists. Who should be compensated for damages, and 
who not? If rising sea level swallows coastal real estates, should the owners 
get subsidies, and how much? If productivity of agricultural lands were ruined 
by desertification, should the state bother with ensuring alternative income for 
rural workers and entrepreneurs? Should the ski parks get public or EU subsi-
dies for snow guns if climate warming means too high temperature for snow-
ing? Etc. 
 
The increasing green tax burden, bond issue and funding for mitigation 
and adaptation raises the dilemma whether does it worth to increase the fiscal 
crowding-out effect in the capital markets or not. This effect is very regional 
market specific because of the interest rate elasticity and marginal propensity 
of saving and investment. Of course, less investment can mean less carbon 
emitting production growth, but also slower technological development in car-
bon reduction, too.  
 
Heller (2003:120-150) recommends conceptual aspects for long-term fis-
cal planning to finance long term mitigation and adaptation to any sustainabil-
ity problem. Certain aspects are the limits or “stop sign” for certain ways of 
adaptation. First of all, the public financing has social welfare function, name-
ly, the support for more vulnerable groups in the society. The climate change 
enlightens, too, that decisions makers should take into account the interest of 
the future generations as one of the most vulnerable group. Thus, the aims of 
policy making shall contain the objective of achieving fairness across genera-
tions, what means excluding Ponzi games
6
 in budgeting, counter-weighting 
short-term political interest and eventually a kind of self-limitation in long-
term borrowing for financing current outlays. The necessity of self-limitation 
rotted in the political economy recognition that there are individual interests 
behind the decisions, the principal-agent problem is an existing occurrence in 
public policy, and short-term interests are overweight, long-term interests are 
underscored in discretionary decisions. Institutional solutions, like fiscal rules, 
fiscal councils can improve the transparency and suppress political myopia, 
thus, treat the political obstacles.  
 
Besides, the government must be able to assess correctly and ensure the fi-
nancial sustainability, namely, the long-term public solvency. Sustainability 
means not only focusing on budget balance, but also, the sustainability of the 
tax burden, the adequate risk management on fiscal threats and weaknesses, 
the sustainable institutional mechanisms to ensure the far future balance, and 
the limitation on future policy makers’ discretionary decisions. The decision 
                                               
6. About Ponzi game in budgeting see more in Buiter & Kletzer (1992). 
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makers must preserve the scope for stabilization measures, even though they 
prefer to use the fiscal policy as an instrument for having influence on the 
economy. The efficiency of allocation for Pareto efficient income production 
means practically the elimination of distorting effects in tax system, the distri-
bution of spending in optimal structure referring to the equity vs. efficiency 
trade-off, and the suppression on red tape concerning the public finances. Of 
course, not just the present, but the legacy of fiscal policy will disperse the po-
sition of countries or regions. Simply, the fiscal legacy can be expressed in the 
current scale of public debt. And not only the extent of debt, but its structure 
will matter, since in dynamic view, it can be the root of suddenly intensifying 
side effects. For example, indebtedness in foreign currency can modify signif-
icantly the solvency of debtors in a foreign exchange rate shock without short 
term risk management instruments. Such impacts are called nonlinearities by 
Heller (2003:149). 
 
In case of threats on fiscal sustainability, the state must be ready to antici-
pate market reactions driven by short-sighted interest. Private sector’s propen-
sity for funding or resource saving can determine crucially the effectiveness 
and scope of public policy actions for adaptation. The governments must think 
about market side effects of the structure of realizing the long-term sustaina-
bility. Will the market help or weaken certain stimulating or restricting ac-
tions? What will be, for example, the effect of lower or higher risk premium 
on private savings and investments? E.g., it is well known about debt crisis 
impacts, that when the direct danger of collapse get milder the private interest 
groups get less devoted to public finances reforms, so, the politicians will ease 
the previous restrictions and deteriorate the previously improved fiscal balance 
or balancing program. 
 
The green adaptation causes structural changes in public finances. This as-
pect supposes to treat the green reform, also, as a structural fiscal reform to-
gether with balancing. The simplest way to move toward fiscal balance is, 
when the incomes grow faster than the expenditures in absolute share. Thus, at 
once, the collapse of economic growth dynamics can be avoided. 
 
That means, the absolute growth of tax burden should be lower than the 
GDP-growth, and comparing even to tax increase, the growth of public ex-
penditures should be much lower. However, this demands the public green 
spending not to be automatic, because the rigid expenditure types insensitive 
for business cycles will make the adjustment of spending unmanageable to the 
governmental solvency. Nevertheless, the tax incomes can not be decreased 
until the expenditures will not decline at least in the same scale. Besides, the 
expansion possibility of state debt means also limit in the play of tax reduc-
tion. (Tomkiewitz 2005). 
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The green reform basically is making an attempt to increase the net present 
value achievable through the fiscal policy, explained with the instruments of 
cost-benefit analysis is the following:  
max PV {benefit of society – cost of society} 
 
However, this cost-benefit analysis is fairly complex, that is why the re-
sults must be treated carefully to avoid misleading understandings. First of all, 
it is hard to measure any side effects of public expenditures and absorption. 
During the estimation of benefits the experts must face the comparison prob-
lem, how commensurable are the individuals’ subjective utility. Wildawsky 
(1997) guess, the appraisal methods used in practice are very uncertain – at 
least in case of public services. The net present value calculation is uncertain 
in dynamics, as the costs can vary in the future. (Kutasi 2006). 
 
The structural green reform of public finances is not simply a corner-
cutting or spare of expenditure targets. Any kind of efficiency-seeking restruc-
turing related to revenues or expenditures can be mentioned under this catego-
ry that will have a positive long-term impact for years or decades. In certain 
circumstances, the previous level of expenditures can be held. The essence of 
reform of public finances is, that the previous financing mechanisms get 
changed or reorganized to create more efficient structure independently form 
the current budget deficit or surplus. 
 
In Drazen’s (1998) approach, the fiscal reform is a common pool. Every-
one consider this common pool to be made, but everyone wants it to be fi-
nanced by others. This way, the possible utility created by a possible reform 
for everyone is in vain if there is high probability for burdening the cost on the 
certain individuals. This will be a ‘war of attrition’ impact on the reform, as 
most of the individuals will not support it. Moreover, the distribution of costs 
means actually a dispute on distribution of tax burden in the planning stage of 
restructuring, what will impede more the execution. Besides, the support of 
reform will be ruined much more in case of uncertainty of individual benefits. 
Many researches were made to find relation between the success of reform 
execution and the political institutional system. (see e.g. Strauch & von Hagen 
2000, von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett & Strauch 2002, Alesina & Perotti 1999, 
Poterba & von Hagen 1999, Benczes 2004, Benczes 2008 etc.) These surveys 
concluded that mostly the plurality of decision makers, the pressure for con-
sensus or the multi-party government usually weaken the fiscal discipline as 
well the not transparent budgeting procedures or the strong bargaining power 
of spending ministers against financial minister. Although, the political and 
multi-party system can not be question of restructuring, making efforts for 
transparency of budgeting procedure and dealing can do a lot for disciplined 
public finances (Kutasi 2006). 
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In public revenue aspect, the dilemma of government control is to use 
Pigovian
7
 carbon tax or command and control the externalities caused by CO2 
emission. critic on green tax is called the “green paradox” by Sinn (2008), 
who suggested that increasing emission taxes accelerate global warming be-
cause resource owners start to fear of higher future taxation and for this reason 
they start to increase near-term extraction. Edenhofer & Kalkuhl (2011) tested 
Sinn’s model for increasing unit taxes on emission, and found that an acceler-
ated resource extraction due to increasing carbon taxes (namely, the green par-
adox) is limited to the following specific conditions: “The initial tax level has 
to be lower than a certain threshold and the tax has to grow permanently at a 
rate higher than the discount rate of resource owners” (Edenhofer & Kalkuhl 
2011:2211). This means that most ranges of carbon taxes for warming mitiga-
tion is not risky for the green paradox. They suggest “quantity instruments” to 
avoid any risk of the paradox. 
 
The expectation from implementation of carbon tax is to mitigate carbon 
emission by pricing the cost of future damage and thus enforcing emission ef-
ficiency. The function of carbon tax is to raise the price of CO2 emission. 
However, to identify the real tax impacts on energy demand and CO2 emission 
is a serious challenge for policy-makers. As it was established by IMF 
(2008b), the conditions of success in mitigation policy are complex. 
 
As any mitigation policies, the carbon taxation must be flexible, robust and 
enforceable. According to Kim et al (2011), carbon tax has an important ad-
vantage over other mitigation measures, namely, that they create a common 
price for emissions, which makes polluters more efficient in emission reduc-
tion. Efficiency of green tax can be understood as how much CO2 emission 
can be reduced in energy use and production or in transportation, if a carbon 
tax is adopted in the mentioned industries. 
 
In comparison to command and control, the advantages of carbon tax can 
be summarized in lower compliance costs, and a continuous incentive to adapt 
in the technology of energy use and conservation. (Cooper 1998, Pizer 1997). 
 
The main advantages of market-based carbon taxation are the following 
according to Cooper (1998), Pizer (1997) Pearce (1991) Nordhaus (2007) and 
Kim et al. (2011):  
• Creating a common price for emission taxation makes firms with lower 
abatement costs emit more. The carbon tax fixes the price of emissions ef-
fectively. 
•The cost for CO2 emission encourages a switch to low-emission technologies 
and activities, and the development of emission-reducing technologies.  
                                               
7. See Pigou (1920). 
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• Carbon-tax systems can make use of existing tax collection mechanisms and 
require less intensive emission monitoring efforts. 
• Carbon tax provides for greater flexibility and adjustment capability for both 
firms and public finances in case of changing economic conditions, allowing 
firms to reduce emissions more during the periods of slow demand growth, 
and providing opportunity for tax easing. 
• The carbon tax can induce a technological change to avoid higher cost, 
which results in lower emission and at the same time technological shift to-
ward better productivity or cost efficiency (Gerlagh & Lise 2005).  
 
The disadvantages are as follows: 
• The new type of tax generates administrative and transaction costs. 
• Without other tax easing, the higher tax burden results a crowding out im-
pact by government. 
• Under carbon tax, the quantity of emission reductions is uncertain. Impact of 
tax is very dependent on non-constant price elasticity and income elasticity. 
• Taxes may be politically difficult to implement (Kim et al. 2011). 
 
Besides, as any type of tax, Pigovian tax has a deadweight loss impact, 
too, on consumers’ benefit. The question is whether this deadweight loss or 
the damage from warming is bigger. The calculation of deadweight demands 
the knowledge of the price elasticity, and the estimation of damage by warm-
ing needs the very uncertain probabilities of climate change. Thus, it is not 
simple to match the alternative losses.
8
 
 
3.5. HOW TO MANAGE THE FISCAL RISK CAUSED BY CLIMATE 
CHANGE? 
 
The general risk management of sustainable budgeting has broad range of 
instruments with many experience of practical implementation. The fiscal 
rules have became often used since the 1990s (see Kopits 2001, Kopits & 
Symansky 1998, Kumar et al. 2009, Benczes 2008, Benczes & Kutasi 
2010:122-144). The different types of rules are the balanced budget rule
9
, the 
public debt rule,
10
 the golden rule,
11
 the expenditure rule.
12
 These rules are 
useful to restrict the short-sighted political decision makers in discretionary 
decision enforcement. 
                                               
8. Critics on Pigovian tax, see:  Buchanan (1969) and Nye (2008). 
9. Limitation on general government balance or primary balance.  
10. Limitation on public debt level. 
11. Debt financing is allowed only in case of public capital investment, infrastructure invest-
ment.    
12. Limitation on overall spending scale. 
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In financing the very long-term impacts, just like the adaptation to climate 
change, the efficient solution for smooth, gradual accumulation is the fiscal 
funding (if the private insurance services can not create opportunity to shift the 
cost toward the private sector). Its weakness is that mostly those countries can 
easily establish such funds who have any way fiscal surplus typically from 
natural resource (oil) export.  
 
The funding specified for climate change is called financing by green 
funding. In national level, it would be possible to select a certain type of fiscal 
revenue (just like the oil exporting countries do with oil trade revenues), and 
indicate it as a source of a fund. In high developed countries, year by year, 
there are specified items in the annual budget for subsidizing the moderniza-
tion of carbon emission related technologies. But such spending frames are 
result of discretionary annual decisions made by the current government. This 
does not ensure the long-term financing of mitigation and adaptation. An au-
tomatic fund could not only ensure the current scale of subsidy, but also the 
security of long-term financing by accumulating the revenues.
13
 Unfortunate-
ly, as it was already mentioned, the public budget has other long-term chal-
lenges related to demography, demanding funding for the future.  
 
Especially in the developing countries, the national accumulation of green 
fund has no source. Besides, eventually the climate change is a global prob-
lem, so national, unilateral adaptation does not seem to be the most efficient. 
Alternative option is the international funding, where national budgets con-
tribute as their quota prescribes. Its advantages are cooperation of low income 
and high income countries, and the stronger governmental commitment to the 
long-term objective as giving up an international membership has more trans-
action cost (diplomacy damage) for a country than splitting a national fund. 
International green fund can be a mixture of national quotas, green tax revenue 
as direct income of the fund and market bonds financed by Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and other private investors (see Fig.3).  
 
Such operating fund is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 
(CCRIF) in the CARICOM, described by IMF (2008:31). CCRIF is multi-
country risk pool and also insurance instrument backed by both public financ-
es and capital markets. It was set to help CARICOM countries mitigate the 
short-term cash flow problems in disaster situations. It is a regional catastro-
phe fund for Caribbean governments, CCRIF operates as a public-private 
partnership, and is set up as a non-profit ‘mutual’ insurance entity. The CCRIF 
pays out in the event of parametric trigger points being exceeded. It provides 
rapid payment if disaster strikes. The CCRIF has coverage for hurricane, 
                                               
13. Of course, ultimately the law-makers can reintegrate any fund back to the annual budget, if 
that is the will of the significant political majority. So national level green funding is neither 
the absolute solution for financing the long-term objectives.  
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earthquake and excess rainfall. The facility is a fund operating particularly like 
insurance. There is plan to involve the agricultural sector and the energy com-
panies.
14
 
 
Figure 3.3. Financing by green funding 
 
Source: Bredenkamp & Pattillo (2010:10) 
 
Similar international green fund is in the period of formation. According to 
the Copenhagen Accord issued at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, international Green Fund shall be ready in 2020 to 
ensure financial aid for developing countries. The design of the exact financ-
ing is illustrated by Figure 3.3 (Bredenkamp & Pattillo 2010). It seems, it is 
possible to capitalize a climate change adaptation from the private sector. The 
international Green Fund will stand on private and public pillars. The public 
pillar is composed from national contribution quotas, national carbon tax in-
comes and national revenue from CO2 quota trade. The private pillar means 
issuing market bonds for private investors.  
 
                                               
14. For more see www.ccrif.org 
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However, any public funding raises the dilemma of crowding-out men-
tioned above, as the CCRIF and Green Fund backed by states pumps the fi-
nancial resources from private investments. Moreover, as a general interna-
tional aiding problem, appearing also in critics on ODA (Official Develop-
ment Aid) operation, that international organizations (funds) are not able to 
achieve critical mass of capital to swing off the developing countries from the 
problem of undercapitalized position blocking the efficient risk management. 
The credibility of such funds will be decided on its operation, the effective 
commitment of the members and the realized results. 
 
To share the financing between public and private actors, namely planned 
and autonomous adaptation, beside the funding, there is an other item have 
been already mentioned in this paper, the insurance. However, simply private 
insurance is not enough to have efficient mitigation or adaptation. Phaup & 
Kirschner (2010) assume that public risk management is more efficient than 
individual, especially if it is preventive. On the other hand, it can become very 
expansive for the state, if private sector individuals see that they can get every 
protection from the state. The only state financed actions are called ex post 
budgeting, as it does not motivate the individuals to be preventive. That is why 
the optimum is the ex ante budgeting which accumulate reserves for the cost 
of catastrophe in the future, both from tax revenue and private income. The 
following options can be combined in the insurance sector for ex ante budget-
ing:  
(1) The state makes market transactions by purchasing insurance service from 
insurance companies. Its advantage is that government can secure insurance 
for anything considered to be necessary. The disadvantage is that the insurance 
sector may will not be able to pay the compensation for all the damages.  
(2) The state prescribes mandated purchase of insurance for the private asset 
owners. The advantage will be that the market will evaluate every object to be 
or not to be worthy for insurance. The disadvantage is that the private risk 
premium is very likely higher than the public risk premium. 
(3) The government-provided insurance means that the state establish a state 
insurance company, e.g. New Zealand Earthquake Commission. In this case, 
the state can control the whole process of insurance, but the possibility of po-
litical intervention is very likely, that is why the efficiency of this option is 
questionable. 
(4) Contingency Fund is the forth option, which is actually the government 
saving fund or green fund mentioned above. 
 
Johns & Keen (2009) based their recommendations on situation of broadly 
afflicting heavy indebtedness and high deficit problems. They suppose to 
charge the CO2 emission with green tax to mitigate the warming and to avoid 
the higher deficit. Of course, introduction of a green tax has many side effects. 
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If it hits the emission target, and CO2 pollution decreases, the tax revenue on 
CO2 scale will also decrease. If the green tax automatically increases the tax 
burden (tax wedge) on the economy, it can have the economic growth to slow 
down. 
 
To manage the growth risk of crowding out and to cope with the crisis and 
recession of 2008, Jones & Keen (2009) proposed “green recovery”, namely 
state investment into green energy sector and CO2 saving technologies. Any-
way, because of recovery, governments have been spending on stimulus pack-
ages. Such green stimuli could serve both the objectives of recovery and the 
mitigation through the multiplying impact of fiscal spending. This green re-
covery can be associated with employment objectives which are especially a 
sensitive field of economic policy, nevertheless in USA where the after crisis 
2008 level of unemployment got up to 9.5-10%. Bossier & Bréchet (1995) has 
already recommended in the middle of 1990s that carbon tax can be connected 
to the cost problems of employment in Europe. As much scale of green tax 
burden would have been levied on the economy, so much scale of social con-
tribution (or any other labor-related employer cost) should be eased by labor 
tax cut. 
 
Even though it sounds simple, many side effects must be taken into ac-
count. How does the carbon emission tax raise the price of energy and fuels? 
If CO2 emission decreases, it means lower tax base, thus lower tax revenue. 
How to sustain the financing of social service systems if social contribution 
(health and pension contribution) has got decreased? Would labor tax really an 
incentive for more employment for companies? Is the tax cut critically enough 
to be effectively cheaper than foreign rivals? If companies do not see more 
demand, a tax cut will not motivate to hire more workers. Bossier & Bréchet 
(1995) warned for the risk of uncertainty and the necessity for simulation be-
fore policy actions. For example the E3ME (energy-environment-economy 
model of EU) by Barker (1998) was an econometric attempt to simulate effect 
of carbon tax on emission, GDP, competitiveness and employment. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It can be established, that climate change has introduced a new aspect into 
the structure of public finances both in expenditure and in revenue side. The 
exact fiscal impact in a given country is very uncertain since neither the exact 
regional natural impact is unsure, nor the unilateral national/regional mitiga-
tion could be enough and efficient without global cooperation. The fiscal im-
pacts can be mapped by calculating with direct spending related to damages 
caused by climate change, and with indirect impacts in revenues and new ex-
penditure themes caused through climate impacts on the economic growth, 
health condition, social relations and energy demand. 
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It is clear, that the multi-year fiscal stimuli to anticipate the global crisis 
started in 2008 created unfavorable fiscal rigidity for new types of spending, 
like climate change related mitigation and adaptation. It is not an easy task to 
enforce the political decision makers to prefer a 50-100 year-long problem to 
their short term interest related to political cycles, either. However, there are 
good practices how to build-in automatisms into the budget by funding, how 
to keep the balanced budget by restructuring of spending and tax systems, how 
to involve the private (autonomous) financial resources through insurance and 
funding. The government must find the optimum distribution of adaptation 
cost between public (planned) and private (autonomous) adapting actors and 
the adequate structure of incentives to motivate the private individuals for co-
operation and participation in mitigation and adaptation to climate change.  
 
The efficient policy should treat with the factors or drivers of climate 
change cost, just like the degree of exposure to gradual and extreme climate 
events, the level of existing protection, the state’s liability for damages, the 
potential and impacts of autonomous adaptation, the cross-border effects, and 
the fiscal capacity. 
 
The public budget must be the reserve for mitigation with complex struc-
ture. Either infrastructural or social or health or industrial or employment etc. 
aspects can connect to the climate problem. It is not simple to introduce any 
fiscal item or action for mitigation and adaptation since fiscal crowding-out 
and multiplier effects must be simulated on savings, investments, carbon emis-
sion, economic growth, competitiveness, external balance and employment. 
The simulation in the same time means testing the policy risk, namely the po-
tential failure of green budget reform, and the political risk, namely loosing 
the next elections because unwanted side effects.  
 
The ideal fiscal policy affected by climate change would be a green stimu-
lus combining spending and green tax, meanwhile keeping the scale and bal-
ance of the budget, but restructuring the fiscal preferences, thus, cutting the 
wage related cost of employment and improving the international competi-
tiveness of the national economy.  
 
As climate change is global problem, international/global cooperation is 
likely to be the most efficient also in fiscal aspect. International cooperation 
can give solution for risk distribution, low income insolvency, credible fund-
ing with private investors, technological cooperation and access to knowledge, 
efficiency of early warning and reserving sustainable national budgets, all to-
gether.  
 
Public Price of Climate Change 
 
 
91 
REFERENCES 
 
Aaheim, A. and M. Aasen (2008) What do we know about the economics of 
adaptation?, CEPS policy brief, No. 150, January 2008. 
 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1999) Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions in: 
Poterba and von Hagen (1999), pp. 13-36. 
 
Barker T. (1998) The effects on competitiveness of coordinated versus unilat-
eral fiscal policies reducing GHG emissions in the EU: an assessment of a 
10% reduction by 2010 using the E3ME model Energy Policy, Vol. 26, No. 
14, pp. 1083-1098. 
 
 Benczes István and Kutasi Gábor (2010) Költségvetési pénzügyek: Hiány, 
államadósság és fenntarthatóság, Akadémiai kiadó (Public budgeting: deficit, 
debt and sustainability). 
 
Benczes I. (2008) Trimming the sails. The comparative political economy of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation CEU Press, New York–Budapest. 
 
Benczes I. (2004) The political-institutional conditions of the success of fiscal 
consolidation, Development and Finance, No.4, Magyar Fejlesztési Bank. 
 
Blanchard, O. J. (1990) Suggestions for a new set of fiscal indicators, OECD 
Working Papers, No. 79, OECD, Paris. 
 
Bossier F. and Bréchet T. (1995) A fiscal reform for increasing employment 
and mitigating CO2 emissions in Europe, Energy Policy, Vol. 23, No. 9, pp. 
789-798. 
 
Bräuer, I., Umpfenbach, K., Blobel, D., Grünig, M., Best, A., Peter, M., and 
Lückge, H. (2009), Klimawandel: Welche Belastungen entstehen für die Trag-
fähigkeit der Öffentlichen Finanzen? Endbericht, Ecologic Institute, Berlin. 
 
Bredenkamp H. and Pattillo C. (2010) Financing the Response to Climate 
Change, IMF Staff Position Note March 25, 2010 SPN10/06. 
 
Buchanan, J. (1969) External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market 
Structure, American Economic Review, Vol. 59, March. 
 
Buti, M., von Hagen, J. and Martinez-Mongay, C. (2002) The behaviour of 
fiscal authorities, Palgrave, European Communities. 
Byrne J.-Hughes K., Rickerson W. and Kurdgelashvili L. (2007) American 
policy conflict in the greenhouse: Divergent trends in federal, regional, state, 
Kutasi 
 
 
92 
and local green energy and climate change policy, Energy Policy, 35, pp. 
4555–4573. 
 
CEPS &ZEW (2010) The Fiscal Implication of Climate Change Adaptation 
Final Report № ECFIN/E/2008/008. 
 
Cooper, R., (1998) Toward a real treaty on global warming, Foreign Affairs, 
77, pp. 66–79. 
 
Drazen, A. (1998) The Political Economy of Delayed Reform, In: Sturzenberg 
& Tommasi.  
 
Edenhofer, O. and Kalkuhl, M. (2011) When do increasing carbon taxes ac-
celerate global warming? A note on the green paradox, Energy Policy, 39, pp. 
2208–2212. 
 
Gerlagh, R. and Lise, W. (2005) Carbon taxes: A drop in the ocean, or a drop 
that erodes the stone? The effect of carbon taxes on technological change, 
Ecological Economics, 54, pp. 241– 260. 
 
Gusdorf F. and Hammoudi A. (2006) Heterogeneity, climate change, and sta-
bility of international fiscal harmonization, HAL Working Papers halshs-
00123293. 
 
Hagen, von J., Hughes-Hallett, A. and Strauch, R. (2002) Budgeting Institu-
tions for Sustainable Public Finances, in: Buti et al. 
 
Heller, P.S. (2003) Who Will Pay? Coping with Aging Societies, Climate 
Change, and Other Long-Term Fiscal Challenges, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington. 
 
IMF (2008a) The Fiscal Implications of Climate Change, Fiscal Affairs De-
partment, International Monetary Fund. 
 
IMF, (2008b) Climate change and the global economy, World Economic Out-
look, International Monetary Fund. 
 
IPCC (2001), Summary for Policymakers: Climate Change 2001 The Scientific 
Basis, International Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
 
Jones B. and Keen M. (2009) Climate Policy and the Recovery, IMF Staff Po-
sition Note, 2009 SPN/09/28. 
Public Price of Climate Change 
 
 
93 
Kim, Y-D., Han, H-O. and Moon, Y-S (2011) The empirical effects of a gaso-
line tax on CO2 emissions reductions from transportation sector in Korea, En-
ergy Policy, 39, pp. 981–989. 
 
Kolodko, G. W., ed. (2005) The Polish miracle: lessons for the emerging mar-
kets, Burlington, VT, Ashgate, pp. 65-80. 
 
 Kopits G. and Symansky, S. (1998) Fiscal policy rules, IMF Occasional Pa-
per 162.  
 
Kopits G. (2001) Fiscal Rules: useful policy framework or unnecessary orna-
ment”, IMF Working Paper 145. 
 
Kumar, M., Baldacci, E. and Schaechter, A. (2009) Fiscal rules. Anchoring 
expectations for sustainable public finances, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
 
Kutasi G. (2006) Budgetary Dilemmas in Eastern EU member states,  Socie-
ty and Economy, Vol. 28, Corvinus University of Budapest. 
 
Lis, E. and Nickel, C. (2009) The impact of extreme weather events on budget 
balances and implications for fiscal policy, European Central Bank Working 
Paper, No. 1055. 
 
Nordhaus, W.D., (2007) To tax or not to tax: alternative approaches to slowing 
global warming, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 1, 26–44. 
 
Nye, J.V.C. (2008) The Pigou Problem. It is difficult to calculate the right tax 
in a world of imperfect Coasian bargains, Regulation, Summer, CATO Insti-
tute [http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv31n2/v31n2-5.pdf]. 
 
O’Hara P. A. (2009) Political economy of climate change, ecological destruc-
tion and uneven development, Ecological Economics, 69, pp. 223–234. 
 
Pearce, D.W. (1991) The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming. 
Economic Journal, 101, pp. 938–948. 
 
Phaup M. – Kirschner C. (2010) Budgeting for Disaster: Focusing on Good 
Times, OECD Journal on Budgeting, 1. 
 
Pigou, A.C. (1920) The Economics of Welfare, London. 
 
Pizer, W.A. (1997) Prices vs. quantities revisited: the case of climate change. 
Resource for the Future Discussion Paper 98-02, Washington. 
Kutasi 
 
 
94 
Poterba, J. M. and von Hagen, J. (1999) Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Perfor-
mance, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London. 
Standard & Poor’s (2007a) The 2007 Fiscal Flexibility Index: Methodology 
and Data Support, Standard & Poor’s [www.standardandpoor’s.com]. 
 
Standard & Poor’s (2007b) Sovereign Ratings In Europe, Standard & Poor’s 
[www.standardandpoor’s.com]. 
 
Stern, N. (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Strauch, R.R. and von Hagen, J. (2000) Institutions, Politics, and Fiscal Poli-
cy, Kluwer Academic Publisher & ZEI, Boston, Dordrecht, London. 
 
Sturzenberg, F. and Tommasi, M. (1998) The Political Economy of Reform, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Tomkiewitz, J. (2005) Fiscal Policy: Growth Booster or Growth Buster?, In: 
Kolodko (2005) pp. 81-98. 
 
Wildavsky, A. (1997) The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, System Analysis, and Program Budgeting, In: R.T. Golembiewski 
and J. Rabin, Public Budgeting and Finance, New York,  pp. 869-91. 
 
